Strategic defensive weapons and evolution of intrawar deterrence : assessing missile defense trends in the Middle East by Kasapoglu, Can & Vehbi, Asim
  
TITLE: 
Strategic Defensive Weapons and Evolution of Intrawar Deterrence: Assessing Missile Defense 
Trends in the Middle East 
AUTHORS: 
1) PhD Can Kasapoglu, Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) / Turkey; 
The American University / Cyprus 
2) PhD Asim Vehbi, The American University / Cyprus 
 
 
In a U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, Andrew Terrill defines the term intrawar 
deterrence as “a process of explicit or tacit bargaining within an ongoing war that still has key limits 
or thresholds that have not been crossed”1. Such a bargaining capacity is directly related to escalation 
and de-escalation trajectories in the course of an armed conflict.  
Without a doubt, offensive strategic weapons play an important role in maintaining intrawar 
deterrence. These weapon systems could function as an asset for deterring adversaries, as well as 
outsiders in the course of a conflict. Furthermore, offensive strategic weapons are seen as tool of 
regime security by many authoritarian regimes and dictatorships, as they are terror weapons that pose 
the very threat of immense and indiscriminate destruction.  
Principally, managing intrawar deterrence through offensive strategic weapons depends on the 
adversary’s strategic vulnerabilities, capacity for second-strike, retaliation means, and decision-
making style. At this point, our work draws attention to the very calculus that paved the ground for the 
1972 ABM Treaty which had kept the Cold War military balance for decades. This calculus was 
formulated as:  Offensive and defensive weapons are inextricably linked; and robust defense can vastly 
complicate the calculation of strategic stability”2.  
Notably, the Middle East could be seen as a focal point for War Studies discipline due to the 
correlation between strategic weapons and intrawar deterrence. Firstly, most of the regional actors see 
strategic weapons as a quick fix solution to overcome conventional shortcomings
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. Secondly, since the 
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, the 
region has witnessed an uninterrupted battlefield-use record of strategic weapons, especially with 
regard to ballistic missiles and biological & chemical weapons. 
As a response to the aforementioned threats, we see an important defensive strategic weapons trend in 
the Middle East. While the Gulf Cooperation Council members have been heavily investing in 
procuring missile defense systems, Turkey has been running its national missile defense tender, the T-
Loramids, which ignited reactions from its NATO allies as Ankara showed early signs of opting for 
the Chinese HQ-9 system
5
.   
Conceptualizing missile defense within the framework of war and strategy theory is not easy. On the 
one hand, as conceptualized by Clausewitz, defense is the stronger form of conducting war, albeit it 
has a negative object. On the other hand, this paper argues that in WMD-tipped ballistic missile versus 
missile defense scenarios, defense cannot be perfectly characterized as the “stronger form of 
conducting war”, but a strategic tool of mitigating strategic vulnerabilities.  
Establishing missile defense architectures is a complex task. From a military standpoint, it necessitates 
multi-layered interception capabilities. Especially for eliminating WMD-tipped warheads, 
exoatmospheric interception capabilities come into the picture, because the risk of contamination 
could theoretically threaten strategic targets and major population centers in case of endo-atmospheric 
interception
6
. Moreover, in numerical calculus, the saturation factor looms large as a major threat to 
missile defenses.  
Building missile defense has many hardships. Firstly, it is a sophisticated system of systems, or C4ISR 
(command-control-communications-computers-intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) 
networks, that only a few nations could rely on their indigenous military industry complexes. 
Secondly, investing in missile defense capabilities stresses defense economics to a considerable extent.  
In the Gulf Cooperation Council area, the aforementioned reality translates into a unique defense 
architecture, depicted as “multilateral bilateralism”7. The multilateral bilateralism approach follows 
two tracks in the Gulf. For some GCC members, as with Bahrain, Qatar and Oman, multilateral 
bilateralism means exclusively relying on the United States’ forward deployed missile defense assets; 
while Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE have procured American systems (i.e. THAAD and the 
Patriot variants), yet, they still need Washington for a complete missile defense umbrella.
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 Although 
the GCC members finally managed to form a Unified Military Command in 2013 with a special focus 
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on missile defense along with other critical issues
9
, still, disagreements between the Gulf nations and 
the aforementioned “multilateral bilateralism” comfort-zone constitute and impediment to an 
integrated GCC missile defense capability. 
Apart from the GCC, another key example of missile defense planning remains the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). In 2010 Lisbon Summit, the allied nations decided to pursue ballistic 
missile defense capability to foster the Alliance’s collective defense. This was major development 
since the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense program which has been initiated in 2005 
and aimed to protect the deployed NATO forces against ballistic missiles up to 3,000km range
10
. As a 
result of the 2010 Lisbon Summit and the 2012 Chicago Summit, NATO has graduated its priorities to 
a new level of protecting the European territory, populations, and forces as a whole. Accordingly, 
within the framework of the European Phased Adaptive Approach, several members of the alliance, 
such as Turkey, Spain, Poland, and Romania, have been playing key roles to form allied, multilayered 
missile defense architecture
11
. 
In the light of a comparative assessment on the GCC and the NATO cases, interoperability comes into 
the picture as a critical factor. Since 2006, when the Bush administration launched the Gulf Security 
Dialogue, interoperability was underlined as a key issue for fostering the GCC military capabilities
12
. 
Since then, Washington’s top priority in the region has been encouraging a “Gulf-wide, interoperable 
missile defense architecture”, as reiterated by the 2014 the GCC – US Strategic Cooperation Forum’s 
joint communiqué
13
. 
Finally, the Israel case shows the importance of multilayering, not only against missiles, but rockets 
and projectiles at the same time. Thus, this study also sheds light on the “Iron Dome phenomenon” in 
recent military endeavors of the Israeli Defense Forces. 
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